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ABSTRACT 
This paper is concerned with semantic analysis of learning concepts within the 
framework of rough set theory. A logic is introduced to express and prove facts 
about relationships between extensions and intensions of concepts in an incom- 
pletely specified universe. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the past ten years a great deal of attention has been devoted to planning, 
designing, construction, and management of knowledge-based information 
systems. Emphasis has been placed on the organization of sophisticated forms of 
information. Among various kinds of information, concepts play the role of 
basic entities. In a literary sense, a concept is an abstract thing that is formed in 
one's mind as a result of a conscious mental process. Concepts are units of 
thought not given in experience but sought by analysis, which discloses the 
syntax of concepts, reflecting their structure, and the semantics of concepts, 
providing their meaning. 
In the philosophy of science, concepts are classified into four groups (Bunge 
[11): 
1. Individual concepts (e.g., Newton), which apply to individuals. What is 
regarded as an individual dep6nds on the level of analysis; an individual on 
a given level may be an aggregate of lower-level individuals. 
2. Class concepts (e.g., living), which apply to sets of individuals. 
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3. Relation concepts (e.g., ordering relation), which apply to relations among 
objects of some kind (e.g., individuals or sets). 
4. Function concepts (e.g., length), which apply to functions of one or more 
arguments. 
The two central questions of research on knowledge representation and 
acquisition in AI systems concern how knowledge is organized and how it can be 
increased. The construction of AI systems has involved the development of 
procedures that not only allow the accumulation of facts but also enable us to 
make intelligent synthesis, that is to aggregate primitive components of 
knowledge into complex ones. 
Although concepts themselves are unobservable, we can articulate, express, 
or represent them by defining their extension or denotation and intension or 
connotation. The extension of a concept is the set of objects that are instances of 
the concept, that is, the set of objects with properties that characterize the 
concept. Extensions consist of individuals, subsets, tuples, and so on, 
depending on the kind of concept. The intension of a concept is the set of 
properties characterizing the objects to which the concept applies. In general, the 
determination f a concept is made jointly by its intension and extension. For 
example, to define the concept 'organism' we should list the earmarks of 
organisms and typical species of organisms. This paper presents a precise formal 
formulation and discussion of the following two facts: 
1. Some properties are sufficient to characterize uniquely the set of instances 
of a given concept. 
2. Some objects are representative instances of a given concept. 
Hence I attempt to answer the question of how extension and intension should be 
acquired to represent the concept properly. Fact 1 says that the properties under 
consideration are the intension of the concept. Fact 2 says that the extension of 
the concept is completely determined by the given objects. 
In analyzing the acquisition of concepts we will take into account the 
unavailability of total information about objects that are supposed to be instances 
of concepts. Lack of information is manifested by the existence of borderline 
instances of concepts. As a consequence we are not able to grasp concepts as 
crisp wholes, and we perceive them as vague objects. Both extension and 
intension of a vague concept can be determined within a tolerance. A process of 
learning concepts hould be organized in a way that enables us to find a set of 
entities as close as possible to the extension of the concept and to find a set of 
properties characterizing instances of the concept as adequately as possible. 
The approach to learning concepts presented here is based on rough set theory 
(Pawlak [2]). This paper is an elaborated version of learning tasks developed 
earlier by Orlowska [3] and includes several ideas presented by Orlowska [4] 
and Pawlak [5]. Another formal approach to concept analysis can be found in 
Wille [6]. Application of rough sets to learning is discussed by Konrad et al [7], 
Pawlak [8], Ra~ and Zemankowa [9], and Wong et al [10]. 
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INDISCERNIBILITY 
Following the theory Of relational databases (Codd [11]) and the theory of 
information systems (Pawlak [12]), we split properties of objects into pairs of the 
form (attribute, value). For example, the property 'to be green' is transformed 
into the pair (color, green), and the counterpart of the property 'to be large' is 
the pair (size, large). In these examples, 'color' and 'size' are attributes of 
objects, and 'green,' and 'large' are values of these attributes, respectively. Any 
green object possesses the property (color, green), and any small object does not 
possess the property (size, large). Consequently, intensions of concepts consist 
of properties formed from (attribute, value) pairs by means of propositional 
operations 'not,' 'and,' 'or,' for some attributes that are meaningful for the 
objects to which the concepts apply. 
We consider a universe of discourse of the form (see Pawlak [12]) 
U=(OB, AT, {VALa}aCAX, f )  
where OB is a nonempty set of objects; AT is a nonempty set of attributes; for 
any a E AT, set VALQ consists of values of attribute a; and f" OB × AT 
VAL = U{VALQ:a E AT } is an information function that assigns values of 
attributes to objects. If for any object o, an attribute a, and a value v of a we 
have f(o, a) = v, then the object o possesses property (a, v). 
Attributes of objects serve as discriminative resources in the universe of 
discourse. Objects may be discernible with respect o some attributes but 
indiscernible with respect o others. For any set A c AT we define the 
indiscernibility relation ind(A ) in set OB of objects: 
indl: (o, o ' )  E ind(A) i f f f (o ,  a)=f(o', a) for all a E A 
For the empty set of attributes we define 
ind2: ind(0) = OB x OB 
The following properties of indiscernibility relations are easily obtained from 
the definition. 
PROPOSITION 1 
a. ind(A) is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive 
b. ind(A U B) = ind(A) O ind(B) 
c. A c B implies ind(B) c_ ind(A) 
Condition la says that indiscernibility relations defined by clauses indl and 
ind2 are equivalence r lations. Condition lb shows that he discriminative power 
of the union of sets of attributes i better than that of the parts of the union. 
Let nR(o) = {O' E OB:(o, O') E R} be the equivalence class of an 
indiscernibility relation R generated by object o. Every equivalence class of the 
form nind(a)(O) for a E AT corresponds toan atomic property of objects, namely 
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to property (a, v) such thatf(o, a) = v. For a setA c AT, the class nina(A)(O) 
corresponds tothe conjunction of all properties (a, v) such that a E A and f (o,  
a) = v. Equivalence classes atisfy the following conditions. 
PROr~SmON 2
a. nind(AUB)(O ) ~- nind(A)(O ) 0 /'/ind(B)(O) 
b. R c S implies nR(o) c ns(o). 
Conditions lb and 2a say that intersection of indiscernibility relations enables 
us to form new properties from some given properties. Properties obtained from 
other properties by means of conjunction provide a finer partition of the set of 
objects than the properties that are the component of the conjunction. 
EXAMPLE 1 Let OB be the set of planets OB = { Mercury (Me), Venus (V), 
Earth (E), Mars (Ma), Jupiter (J), Saturn (S), Uranus (U), Neptune (N), Pluto 
(P)}. Let AT consist of three attributes: D = 'distance from the Sun,' S = 
'size,' and M = 'possession of a moon.' The values of attribute D are 'near' and 
'far'; the values of attribute S are 'small,' 'medium,' 'large'; and the values of 
attribute M are 'yes,' 'no.' The information function is given in Table 1. 
Equivalence classes determined by the indiscernibility relations correspond- 
ing to the given attributes are as follows: 
ind(S): X1 = {Me, V, E, Ma, P} X2= {J, S} X3 = {U, N} 
ind(D): Y1 = {Me, V, E, Ma} Y2 = {J, S, U, N, P} 
ind(M): Z1 = {Me, V} Z2= {E, Ma, J, S, U, N, P} 
ind(M, D): T1 = {Me, V} T2 = {E, Ma} T3 = {J, S, U, N, P} 
ind(S, D): Wl = {Me, V, E, Ma) W2 = {J, S} 
W3={U,  N} W4={P} 
Table 1. 
S /3 M 
Me small near no 
V small near no 
E small near yes 
Ma small near yes 
J large far yes 
S large far yes 
U medium far yes 
N medium far yes 
P small far yes 
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Equivalence classes of indiscernibility relations correspond to the properties 
XI: to be small 
X2: to be large 
X3: to be medium 
YI: to be near the sun 
Y2: to be far from the sun 
Z l: to have no moon 
Z2: to have at least one moon 
T2--Y1 f') Z2: to be near the sun and to have a moon 
W4 = X1 fq Y2: to be small and to be far from the sun 
New properties can also be obtained by forming the transitive closure U * of 
the union of indiscernibility relations. 
PROPOSITION 3 
a. RUS_RU*S  
b. nRu,s(O) = U{nR(t):t E ns(o)} U U{ns(t):t E nR(o)} 
Since the relation ind(A) U * ind(B) cannot be obtained from ind(A) and 
ind(B) by means of set-theoretical operations, the properties corresponding to its 
equivalence classes are not expressible as propositional combinations of 
properties represented by ind(A ) and ind(B). Moreover, in general, ind(A ) U * 
ind(B) is not of the form ind(C) for some C ~ AT. These problems have been 
discussed by Orlowska [13]. 
EXAMPLE 2 Assume that we are given seven objects consisting of circles and 
crosses. We have OB = {ol ,  02, 03, 04, o5, 06, o7}, andAT = {number of 
circles (©), number of crosses (t)}. The information function is given in the 
following table: 
© t 
o l  1 1 
o2 1 2 
o3 2 1 
o4 2 2 
o5 3 3 
o6 3 4 
o7 3 4 
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Equivalence classes of indiscernibility relations ind(O) and ind(t) are as 
follows: 
ind(O): {ol, o2}, {03, o4}, {05, 06, 07} 
ind($): {ol, o3}, {02, o4}, {o5}, {06, 07} 
The transitive closure of the union of these relations provides the following 
equivalence classes: 
ind(O) U* ind(t): X1 = {ol, 02, 03, 04} X2= {05, 06, 07} 
Observe that the names of properties corresponding tothese equivalence classes 
cannot be obtained as a propositional combination of names of properties 
represented by the equivalence classes of ind(O) and ind($), since there is no 
boolean relationship between ind(A ) U * ind(B) and its components. However, 
we observe that X1 corresponds to a new property 'number of circles and 
number of crosses less than 3.' 
We conclude that when we perform operations on indiscernibility relations we 
form new properties from the primitive properties given in the universe under 
consideration. New properties obtained by intersection and transitive closure of 
the union of indiscernibility relations can be expressed in the form (attribute, 
value). The new relation plays the role of attribute, and the equivalence classes 
of the relation correspond to the values of this attribute. 
RELATIVE DEFINABILITY OF SETS OF OBJECTS 
Indiscernibility influences the definability of sets of objects by means of 
attributes from the set AT. Given a set A _ AT, in general sets of objects cannot 
be defined uniquely in terms of properties determined by ind(A). Following 
rough set theory, for any subset X of set OB we define a lower approximation 
RX and the upper approximation/~X of X with respect to indiscernibility R as 
follows: 
• RX is the union of those equivalence classes of R that are contained in X. 
• ]~X is the union of those equivalence classes of R that have an element in 
common with X. 
We say that a set X is R-definable iff RX = X = RX or X = 0. A set X is 
strongly R-definable iff X is an equivalence class of R. 
EXAMPLE 3 Consider the universe from Example 1 and set X = { Me, V, E, 
Ma, J, S }. Its approximations with respect to ind(size) are as follows: 
ind(size)X= {J, S} =X-{Me,  V, E, Ma} 
ind(size)X=X U {U} 
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Hence, set X is not definable by means of the attribute 'size.' Clearly, it is 
definable by means of all the attributes, namely o E X iff o possesses the 
property '(size, small) and (distance, near) or (size, large) and (distance, far) 
and (moon, yes).' 
EXAMPLE 4 Consider the universe OB from Example 2 and the set X = { o 1, 
02, 03, 04}. It is ind(©)-definable. To obtain strong definability we have to 
construct a compound property. It is easy to see that X is strongly definable with 
respect to ind(©) U * ind('l'). 
Let us observe that approximations satisfy the following conditions. 
PROPOSITION 4 If R c S then for any X c OB the following conditions hold: 
a. _sx c_ Rs, ~x  ~_ Sx  
b. If X is S-definable then it is R-definable. 
In terms of approximations we define sets of positive, negative, and 
borderline instances of sets of objects. 
POS(R)X= _RX 
NEG(R)X= OB - /~X 
BOR(R )X = RX-  RX 
POS(R)X is the set of positive instances of X with respect to indiscernibility R. 
Its elements definitely, relative to properties corresponding to R, belong to X. 
NEG(R)X is the set of negative instances of X. Its elements definitely, up to R, 
do not belong to X. BOR(R)X is a doubtful region; its elements possibly belong 
to X, but we cannot decide for certain considering only properties corresponding 
to R. In other words, as far as indiscernibility R is concerned, nothing can be 
said about membership n X of elements from BOR(R)X. 
PROPOSITION 5 
a. POS(R)X, NEG(R)X, and BOR(R)X are pairwise disjoint. 
b. POS(R)X U NEG(R)X U BOR(R)X = OB 
e. POS(R)X, NEG(R)X, and BOR(R)X are R-definable. 
PgoPosmoN 6
a. If A _ B then POS(ind(A))X c_ POS(ind(B))X, NEG(ind(A))X c 
NEG(ind(B))X, and BOR(ind(B))X _ BOR(ind(A))X. 
b. If R c S then POS(S)X c POS(R)X, NEG(S)X c_ NEG(R)X, and 
BOR(R)X ~ BOR(S)X. 
PROPOSITION 7 
a. POS(R)X c_ X, NEG(R)X c_ -X  
b. POS(R)Q~ = Q,  NEG(R)OB = Q 
e. POS(ind(Q)))X = O for X ~ OB, POS(ind(Q~))OB = OB 
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d. NEG(ind(D))X = Q for X *: O ,  NEG(ind(Q))Q = OB 
e. I fX  c_ Ythen POS(R)X c POS(R)Yand NEG(R)Y _c NEG(R)X. 
PROPOSITION 8 
a. POS(R)X U POS(R)Y c POS(R)(X U Y) 
b. POS(R)(X O Y) = POS(R)X O POS(R)Y 
e. POS(R) ( -X)  = NEG(R)X 
PROPOSITION 9 
a. NEG(R)(X U Y) = NEG(R)X O NEG(R) Y 
b. NEG(R)X U NEG(R) Y __G MEG(R) (X O Y) 
c. NEG(R) ( -X)  = POS(R)X 
PROPOSITION 10 
a. BOR(R) (X O Y) c BOR(R)X U BOR(R) Y 
h. I fXO Y= Q thenBOR(XO Y) = BOR(R)XU BOR(R)Y 
e. BOR(R)(X N Y) _c BOR(R)X n BOR(R)Y 
d. BOR(R) ( - X )  = BOR(R)X 
PROPOSITION 1 1 
a. POS(ind(A))X U POS(ind(B))X c_ POS(ind(A U B))X 
b. POS(ind(A n B))X c_ POS(ind(A))X O POS(ind(B))X 
e. NEG(ind(A))X O NEG(ind(B))X c_ NEG(ind(A U B))X 
d. NEG(ind(A O B))X c_ NEG(ind(A))X O NEG(ind(B))X 
PROPOSITION 12 The following conditions are equivalent: 
a. A set X is R-definable. 
b. BOR(R)X = Q) 
e. POS(R)X = -NEG(R)X  
We conclude that subsets of set OB, corresponding toextensions of concepts, 
might not be uniquely defined in terms of properties belonging to intensions of 
these concepts. The unique correspondence b tween extension and intension is 
reflected by definability of the extension with respect to indiscernibility 
determined by properties from the intension. If the extension is definable, then 
all the objects can be classified into positive or negative instances of the 
respective concept. If the extension is not definable with respect to indiscernibil- 
ity determined by the intension, then the corresponding set of borderline 
instances is nonempty, and consequently some of the objects can be classified 
neither as the positive instances nor as the negative instances of the respective 
concept. In the following two sections we discuss the problem of acquisition of 
concepts. We split the problem into two tasks: the task of learning intensions and 
the task of learning extensions. The fact that extensions are defined up to 
indiscernibility determined by intensions plays the crucial role in these 
investigations. 
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LEARNING INTENSIONS OF CONCEPTS 
Let a universe U = (OB, AT, { VALo }ae AT, f) be given. Assume that a set X 
OB is the extension of a certain concept. The task of learning the intension of 
this concept can be formulated as follows: 
Given: A set X c OB representing the extension of a concept 
Find: A minimal set of A of attributes such that X is ind(A )-definable; or i fX  
is not ind(AT)-definable, find a minimal set A c AT such that for every B c 
AT ind(B)X c ind(A )X and ind(A )X c ind(A )X. 
Thus the intension of the concept whose extension is X consists of those 
properties that are determined by ind(A ) such that A provides either definability 
of X or, if it is not possible to obtain its definability in the given universe, A
provides the approximations of X that are as close as possible (with respect o 
inclusion) to X. 
EXAMPLE 5 This example is a slight modification of an example from Hunt et 
al [14]. The set OB consists of seven animals A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7 that 
are characterized by means of attributes 'size' (S), 'animality' (A), and 'color' 
(C). Values of attribute 'size' are VALs = {small, medium, large}, values of 
attribute 'animality' are VAL,4 = {bear, dog, cat, horse}, and values of 
attribute 'color' are VALc= {black, brown}. Table 2 shows the values of 
attributes for the given objects. 
Assume that we are given the extension X = { A 1, A2, A3, A6, A7 } of the 
concept 'dangerous animal,' and we are looking for its intension. Consider the 
indiscernibility relation ind(S, A). Its equivalence classes are as follows: 
ind(S, A): {A1}, {A2}, {A3}, {An}, {A5}, {A6, A7} 
It is easy to see that X is ind(S, A )-definable and that it is not definable by means 
Table 2. 
S A C 
A 1 small bear black 
A2 medium bear black 
A3 big dog brown 
A4 small cat black 
A5 medium horse black 
A6 big horse brown 
A7 big horse brown 
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of any single attribute. Observe that property '(animality, bear) and (size, small) 
or (animality, bear) and (size, medium)' is equivalent inour universe to property 
'(animality, bear).' Similarly, property '(animality, dog) and (size, large) or 
(animality, horse) and (size, large)' is equivalent to (size, large). We conclude 
that he intension of the given concept consists of the property '(animality, bear) 
or (size, large).' 
EXAMPLE6 LetOB = {ol ,  02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07} and AT = {a,b}.  
Assume that the attributes provide the following equivalence classes: 
ind(a): {ol, 02, o3}, {04, o5}, {06, 07} 
ind(b): {ol, 04, o5}, {02, o3}, {06, 07} 
ind(a, b): {ol}, {02, o3}, {04, o5}, {06, 07} 
Let X = {05, 06, 07} be the extension of a certain concept. The 
approximations of set X are as follows: 
ind(a)X= {06, 07} 
ind(b)X= {06, 07} 
ind(a, b)X= {06, 07} 
ind(a)X= {04, 05, 06, 07} 
ind(b)X= Col, 04, 05, 06, 07} 
ind(a, b)X= {04, 05, 06, 07} 
Set X is not ind(a, b)-definable. Set { a } is a minimal set of attributes providing 
the best approximations of X. 
The set of attributes obtained as a result of learning intension provides the 
properties that enable us to distinguish as precisely as possible the objects that 
are the positive instances of the given concept from the objects that are its 
negative instances. In the case of definability, the distinguishability s complete; 
and if definability cannot be obtained, then distinguishability is the optimal 
possible in the given universe. Hence the obtained properties really are the 
characteristic properties of the concept. Moreover, the number of those 
properties i  as small as possible. 
LEARNING EXTENSIONS OF CONCEPTS 
Assume that we are given the intension of a concept, that is, a set of properties 
expressed as propositional combinations of some (attribute, value) pairs. To 
define the extension of the concept we have to find typical instances of this 
concept such that membership of any other object in the extension can be 
established by comparing this object with those typical instances. To be more 
formal, the task of learning extensions can be formulated as follows. 
Given: A set P of properties expressed in terms of attributes from a set A c 
AT 
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Find: A minimal set X c OB such that for all o E OB o E ind(A )X iff o 
obeys some property from P 
EXAMPLE 7 Let the set of objects consist of eight patients of a certain 
hospital, OB = {P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8}, and let AT = {sl, s2} be 
the set of parameters whose values can confirm the occurrence of a certain 
illness. For example, we can have the parameters 'blood pressure' and 
'occurrence of myeloblasts.' Let VALsl = { normal, low, high } and VALs2 = 
{ +,  -} .  Assume that the respective indiscernibility relations provide the 
following equivalence classes and properties: 
ind(sl): {P1, P2, P3}, (sl, normal) 
{P4, P5}, (sl, low) 
{P6, P7, P8}, (sl, high) 
ind(s2): {P1, P2, P3, P8}, (s2, - )  
{P4, P5, P6, P7}, (s2, +) 
Assume that the intension of concept 'leukemia' consists of the two properties 
pl = (sl, low) or (sl, high) 
p2 = (s2, + ) 
Observe that every object from the set X = { P4, P5, P6, P7 } obeys these 
properties. However, to get the representative instances of the extension of the 
concept under consideration, we should only take exactly one element from 
equivalence classes {P4, P5 } and { P6, P7 } of relation ind(sl, s2). It is easy to 
see that for sets Y1 = {P4, P6}, Y = {P4, P7}, Y3 = {P5, P6}, and Y4 = 
{P5, P7} the condition ind(sl, s2)Yi = X, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, is satisfied. 
The set of objects obtained as a result of learning extension consists of 
representative examples of instances of a given concept, that is, it provides the 
pattern of any other instance of the concept. Moreover, the set of these xamples 
is exactly as big as necessary to represent properly all the other instances. 
Learning extensions and learning intensions are defined for a fixed universe. 
In the case of a dynamic hange in the object population the analysis hould be 
remade. A detailed iscussion of dynamic learning is given by Pawlak [15]. 
LOGIC FOR REASONING ABOUT CONCEPTS 
I will now define a formal propositional language for reasoning about 
concepts. In this language I introduce formal counterparts ofboth extension and 
intension of concepts. Intensions are represented by indiscernibility relations 
determined by attributes. To express explicitly the dependence of indiscernibil- 
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ity on attributes I introduce special attribute expressions, interpreted as sets of 
attributes. The language contains modal operators corresponding to approxima- 
tions of sets of objects; these operators are determined by indiscernibility 
relations. The language is defined in two steps. First, an auxiliary set of attribute 
expressions is introduced, and second, the set of formulas is constructed. 
Attribute expressions are built up from symbols taken from the following 
disjoint sets: 
VARAT a set of variables representing sets of attributes 
{ - ,  U, n } the set of set-theoretical operations of complement, union, and 
intersection, respectively 
The set EXPRAT of attribute expressions is the smallest set satisfying the 
conditions 
VARAT c_ EXPAT 
A, B E EXPAT imp l ies -A ,  A U B, A O B E EXPAT 
The set EXPREL of relational expressions interpreted as indiscernibility 
relations is the smallest set satisfying the conditions 
A E EXPAT implies ind(A) E EXPREL 
R, S E EXPREL implies R n S, R U* S E EXPREL 
Formulas of the language are constructed out of the symbols from the 
following pairwise disjoint sets: 
VARPROP a set of propositional variables interpreted as sets of objects 
{ -~, v, A, ---,, ~ } the set of classical propositional operations of negation, 
disjunction, conjunction, implication, and equivalence, respec- 
tively 
{ [ ], ( ) } the set of modal propositional operations 
The set FOR of formulas is the smallest set satisfying the conditions 
VARPROP c FOR 
F, G E FOR implies "-1 F, F V G, F A G, F~G,  F ~ G E FOR 
F E FOR,R E EXPREL imply [R]F, (R)F E FOR 
The semantics of the language is defined by means of the notion of model and 
the satisfiability of the formulas in a model. Given a universe U = (OB, AT, 
{VALo}aEAT, f ) ,  by a model we mean the system M = (U, m),  where m is a 
meaning function satisfying the conditions 
m(p) c OB for p E VARPROP 
m(A) c AT for A E VARAT 
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m(A U B)=m(A)  U m(B) m(A 0 B)=m(A)  rl m(B) 
m(-A)= -m(A)  
m(ind(A )) = ind(m(A )) for A E EXPAT 
m(R N S)=m(R) 0 m(S) m(R U* S)=m(R) U* re(S) 
We say that a formula F is satisfied by an object o in model M(M, o sat F )  
whenever the following conditions are satisfied: 
M, osatp  i f fo  E m(p) forp E VARPROP 
M, osat  -', F iff not M, o sat F 
M, osatFVG if fM, osatForM,  osatG 
M, osatFAG iffM, osatFandM,  osatG 
M, osatF -*G i f fM, osat - -1FVG 
M, o sat F ~ G i f fM, o sat (F-*G) A (G-*F) 
M, o sat [R } F iff for all s E OB if 
(o, s) E m(R) then M, s sat F 
M, o sat (R)F iff there is s E OB such that 
(o, s) E m(R) and M, o sat F 
We define the value valMF of formula F in model M: 
ValM F= {o E OB: M, o sat F} 
PROPOSITION 13 
a. ValMp----re(p) for p E VARPROP 
b. ValM'~F = -- valMF 
C. ValMF V G = valMF U ValMG 
d. ValMF A G = valMF N valMG 
e. ValMF-* G = ValM "~ FV  G 
f. ValMF ~ G = ValM(F -* G) A (G -* F) 
g. ValM[R]F = m(R)ValMF 
h. ValM(R)F = m(R)valMF 
Proposition 13 says that classical propositional operations correspond to set- 
theoretical operations, and that modal operations [ ] and ( ) correspond to 
operations of lower and upper approximation, respectively. 
We say that a formula F is satisfiable in M (M sat F) if there is o E OB such 
that M, o sat F. A formula F is true in M(~ MF) if M, o sat F for all o E OB. A 
formula F is valid ( ~ F )  if F is true in all models. 
Below are listed some facts expressible in the given language. 
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PROPOSITION 14 
a. =MF ~ [R]F iff valmF is m(R)-definable 
b. =m[R]F  iff POS(m(R))valMF = OB 
e. ~M ~ [R]F i f f  POS(m(R))valMF = Q.  
d. ~ M ~ (R)F  iff NEG(m(R))valMF = OB 
e. = M(R)F iff NEG(m(R))ValMF = Q 
f. =M(R)F A (R) --1 F i f fBOR(m(R))valMF = OB 
g. ~M[R]F V [R] "~ F iff BOR(m(R))valMF = (~ 
PROPOSITION 15 
a. M sat [R]F iff POS(m(R))valMF ¢ 0 
b. M sat -'1 (R)F  iff NEG(m(R))valMF =/: Q 
e. M sat (R) F A (R) -~ F iff BOR(m(R))valMF ¢ Q 
d. M sat -~ [R]F iff POS(m(R))VaIMF =/: OB 
e. M sat (R)F  iff NEG(m(R))VaIMF ¢ OB 
f. M sat [R]F v [R] -~ F iff BOR(m(R))valMF ¢OB 
PROPOSITION 16 The following formulas are valid: 
a. [R]F v [S]F ---, [R tq S]F 
b. [R U* S]F ~ [R]F A [S]F 
c. [ind(A)]F v [ind(B)]F ~ [ind(A U B)]F 
d. [ind(A tq B)]F ~ [ind(A)]F ^  [ind(B)]F 
Since indiscernibility relations and their intersections and transitive closures 
are equivalence r lations, the operations [R] and (R) for R E EXPREL are $5 
modalities. Hence all the formulas that are substitutions of theorems of logic $5 
are valid in the given logic. 
The proposals made here to modify the syntax and semantics of standard 
modal logics enable us to express relationships between intensions and 
extensions of concepts. Intensions are represented by the respective indiscern- 
ibility relations. Positive, negative, and borderline instances of concepts can be 
expressed by means of modal operations. In the given logic we can also express 
the learning tasks discussed earlier. 
PROPOSITION 17 
a. If for any B we have ~M (ind(A))F ~ (ind(B))F and ~M[ind(B)]F -~ 
[ind(A)]F, then re(A) is a minimal set of attributes providing adequate 
characterization f the set valuF. 
b. If ~M(ind(A))F o G and for any formula H i f  ~M(ind(A))H o G then 
~MF --" H, then ValMF is a minimal set of objects providing 
representation f the extension ValMG of a certain concept. 
Conditions 17 a and 17b express learning intensions and learning extensions, 
respectively. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Logical aspects of concept learning have been discussed here within the 
framework of rough set theory. A language has been introduced for expressing 
and proving the tasks of learning intensions and learning extensions of concepts 
that is an extension of modal languages. Modal operators are determined by 
indiscernibility relations generated by sets of attributes. Expressions in the 
formulas of this language explicitly represent hose sets of attributes and 
indiscernibility relations. A Kripke-style semantics for the language is defined in 
which indiscernibility relations play the role of accessibility relations. However, 
the given semantics differs from the usual semantics of modal ogics because the 
accessibility relations are relative to sets of attributes. The problem of complete 
axiomatization f the language is open. The main difficulty lies in characterizing 
relative accessibility relations. The decidability of the satisfiability problem for 
the fragment of the language without operations tq and O * on indiscernibility 
relations has been proved by Nakamura [16]. 
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